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Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts:
Moral Equivalence, Double Effect, and
Clinical Practice
Howard Brody*
When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from
the rulings of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals'
on whether laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide (PAS)
were constitutional, it opened the way for a legal debate over
two relatively arcane ethical concepts. The moral equivalence
hypothesis holds that if allowing a patient to die by forgoing
life-sustaining medical treatment is moral (or immoral), then
PAS or active euthanasia must be moral (or immoral) to the
same degree. The principle of double effect holds that it is
moral to administer high-dose narcotics to dying patients, even
though there may be some risk of hastening death, whereas it
is not moral to administer an overdose of such drugs deliber-
ately to cause death.
These two ethical constructs can be debated in detail and
at length, and the protracted discussion would be of great in-
terest in a graduate seminar on ethical theory; however, it
would probably put the average physician or attorney promptly
to sleep. Nonetheless, the two ethical constructs have, in an
implicit rule-of-thumb fashion, helped to guide routine medical
practice for some time. Most physicians have conducted their
practices as if the moral equivalence hypothesis were false and
the principle of double effect were true.
It was therefore striking when the two federal appellate
courts recognized a constitutional liberty interest in PAS on
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L See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997);
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grounds that strongly suggested the moral equivalence hy-
pothesis is true and the principle of double effect amounts to
hypocritical rationalization. Admittedly, the average physician
does not dissect the detailed reasoning in court decisions and
modify her clinical practice accordingly. But it is at least
noteworthy, if not actually worrisome, when such a radical dis-
connect appears between the reasoning of federal judges and of
practicing physicians on a highly controversial matter of medi-
cal practice.
This Article will summarize the recent history of the two
ethical constructs and identify the role they played in the two
appellate court rulings. It will then assess the final rulings of
the Supreme Court and discuss their possible implications for
clinical practice in the future. Although the Article will allude
to what ethics scholars and the courts have said about these
issues, its principal focus will be upon the ethical "rules of
thumb" under which physicians operate in everyday practice.
In many ways, the quality of care that patients receive depends
more on these crude and under-analyzed rules of thumb than
on more elegant and logically consistent theories of ethical and
legal behavior.2
THE MORAL EQUIVALENCE HYPOTHESIS
A defining moment of sorts occurred in the emerging field
of bioethics in 1975 when a philosopher, James Rachels, pub-
lished a paper on the moral equivalence hypothesis in the New
England Journal of Medicine.3 It was quite a new development
at the time for a philosopher to presume to instruct physicians
on medical ethics, especially when the philosopher was declaring
that a widely accepted ethical principle was in fact fatally flawed
and when the medical editor of a major journal was granting
him the forum to do so. Despite the revolutionary nature of the
2. In the discussion that follows, I will scrutinize the recent court opin-
ions to determine the adequacy with which they deal with the ethical con-
structs. I agree that the courts are not trying to "get the ethics right" but
rather are interpreting the law. (I am grateful to Susan Wolf for calling my
attention to this point.) Nonetheless, the criticisms might be helpful for two
reasons: first, if the opinions lack logical coherence, they might be flawed in
their legal, as well as ethical, reasoning; second, the message physicians re-
ceive from the courts regarding the optimal "rules of thumb" for everyday
practice will depend not purely on the law but also on the perceived "fit" be-
tween the legal opinions and the widely accepted ethical dictates.
3. James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 78 (1975).
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article, subsequent letters to the editor showed that the average
practitioner remained unswayed by the philosophical argu-
ments.4
Rachels took direct aim at the American Medical Associa-
tion's (AMA's) ethical stance that physicians could withdraw or
withhold life-prolonging medical therapy, but could never ethi-
cally participate in mercy killing.5 Expressing relative indif-
ference to the question of whether active euthanasia was ethi-
cal or unethical, Rachels zeroed in on the conceptual dilemma:
Is it consistent to have one ethical judgment about allowing a
patient to die and a different ethical judgment about active
killing? Rachels agreed that most cases of active killing were
indeed morally wrong, while many cases of allowing to die were
morally defensible, but that left open the question of whether
these different moral judgments arose because of what Rachels
called the "bare difference" between killing and allowing to die,
or for other reasons unique to the individual cases or categories
of cases involved.
Rachels proposed to resolve this dilemma through a sort of
ethical experiment. He constructed a hypothetical case in
which the only difference between two actions was the "bare
difference" between killing and allowing to die; all other mor-
ally compelling features, such as consequences, motives, and
intentions, were held constant. He called this hypothetical
case the case of Smith and Jones. Supposedly, Smith and
Jones each stand to gain an inheritance at the death of a
nephew; each sneaks in while the nephew is taking a bath,
fully intending to hold the child's head underwater until he
drowns. Smith does exactly that, but Jones happens to enter
the bathroom just as the child slips, hits his head on the edge
of the tub, and falls unconscious with his face submerged.
Jones could easily save the child's life by reaching in and lift-
ing his head above water, but instead he stands and watches
as the child drowns.
Rachels wondered whether any reader would judge Smith
and Jones differently, based on the distinction that one actively
4 See Letters, Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 863, 863-66 (1975).
5. See Rachels, supra note 3, at 79. It is worth noting that the "right to
die" debate through the 1970s and 1980s was about allowing to die versus ac-
tive euthanasia; PAS did not really enter into the discussion until the late
1980s. See, e.g., Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility To-
ward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 847-
48 (1989).
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killed the nephew while the other "merely" allowed him to die.
No one offered a justification for doing anything other than
condemning both Smith and Jones to an equal degree. This, to
Rachels, proved his point. If we judge the case of killing to be
morally worse than the case of letting die, it must be due to
some difference in the motives, intentions, or consequences of
the act, not any general or principled difference between the
two actions per se.
Other philosophers and ethicists have been debating Ra-
chels's conclusions in the twenty-three years since the article's
publication, and no single consensus position has emerged.6 I
would, however, defend as the best conclusion a critique of Ra-
chels's basic method. What led Rachels to assume that he
could answer the general question of whether forgoing treat-
ment and active euthanasia were morally equivalent merely by
devising a pair of hypothetical cases, especially cases that had
nothing to do with medical practice? Rachels explained that he
could do so to the extent that ethical rules and principles are
universally applicable, and are thus largely independent of the
real-life context of the individual case If one begins to chal-
lenge this view of ethical reasoning, as has occurred with in-
creasing frequency in the last twenty years,8 then one is less
convinced by Rachels's logic.
Perhaps the most thorough rebuttal of Rachels was suggested
by Paul Menzel.9 Menzel argued that in some medical contexts,
there might be a major moral difference between killing and
allowing to die; in other medical contexts, the difference might
be less or even nonexistent. In the end, he disagreed with both
Rachels and the AMA. He disagreed with Rachels by saying
that only after exploring in detail the actual case circum-
6. For representative replies to Rachels, see Martin Benjamin, Death,
Where Is Thy Cause?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1976, at 15; KID. Clouser,
Allowing or Causing: Another Look, 87 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 622 (1977);
Jean Davies, Raping and Making Love Are Different Concepts: So are Killing
and Voluntary Euthansasia, 14 J. MED. ETHICS 148 (1988); Raymond J. De-
vettere, The Imprecise Language of Euthanasia and Causing Death, 1 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 268 (1990); Jeff McMahan, Killing, Letting Die, and With-
drawing Aid, 103 ETHICS 250 (1993); Richard L. Trammel, The Presumption
Against Taking Life, 3 J. MED. & PHIL. 53 (1978).
7. See JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 139-151
(1986).
8. See, e.g., ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICs AND MORAL CONSERVATISM (Stanley
G. Clark & Evan Simpson eds., 1989).
9. See Paul T. Menzel, Are Killing and Letting Die Morally Different in
Medical Contexts?, 4 J. MED. PHIL. 269 (1979).
[Vol. 82:939942
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stances could one judge whether allowing to die and killing
might be morally equivalent. And he disagreed with the AMA
by noting that in at least some medical contexts, if allowing to
die was acceptable, then the logic of the circumstances would
dictate that active euthanasia would be acceptable as well. It
is precisely the set of cases where Menzel saw the moral differ-
ence between killing and allowing to die approaching zero that
we now view as the "best candidate" for permitting PAS: a
competent, suffering, terminally ill patient who has exhausted
all other means for symptom relief.
I have tried to extend Menzel's general line of argument to
show that the killing/letting die distinction fails to do the
moral "work" that many expect of it." One might argue that
killing is wrong and allowing to die by forgoing treatment is
acceptable because in killing, one directly intends and causes
death, which is not true of allowing to die. I have tried to show
through medical case examples that the degree to which one
intends and causes death varies along a spectrum; there is no
bright line that separates allowing to die and killing. For ex-
ample, there are a few cases, admittedly atypical, in which a
patient has suicidal impulses for what most would consider ir-
rational reasons, but also happens to be dependent upon medi-
cal life support. If such a patient refuses ongoing life support
and dies as a consequence, is that PAS or "merely" forgoing
life-sustaining therapy? Certainly the patient, if minimally
competent, has a legal right to refuse the treatment, even in
jurisdictions where PAS is illegal.
A succinct summary of the validity of the moral equiva-
lence hypothesis was provided a decade ago by Raanan Gillon."
He distinguished two arguments: that there is a necessary
moral equivalence between killing and letting die, and that
there is no necessary moral difference between killing and let-
ting die. Both, he states, are false; there are a few circum-
stances in which letting a patient die would be morally
equivalent to killing the patient, but there are many more
cases in which, due to the specific circumstances, the two acts
would be quite morally distinct. The problem, he suggests, is
that many seem to conclude from the fact that there is no nec-
10. See Howard Brody, Causing, Intending, and Assisting Death, 4 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 112 (1993).
IL See Raanan Gillon, Euthanasia, Withholding Life-Prolonging Treat-
ment, and Moral Differences Between Killing and Letting Die, 14 J. MED.
ETHICS 115 (1988).
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essary moral difference that killing and allowing to die must
necessarily be morally equivalent. For Gillon, Rachels's
thought experiment may have successfully proven that in at
least one circumstance there is no necessary moral difference,
but it certainly failed to show that there is necessary moral
equivalence.
Of late, even staunch defenders of PAS and active euthanasia
either have avoided using the moral equivalence hypothesis, or
else appeared aware of its difficulties. For example, Dan
Brock, in one of the most cogent philosophical defenses of a
right to PAS and euthanasia," was careful not to employ the
moral equivalence hypothesis in its pure form. He argued not
that PAS and forgoing treatment are equivalent moral acts,
but rather that the same reasons that justify forgoing treat-
ment, such as appeals to patient autonomy and a desire to re-
lieve suffering, are the reasons that can be given in defense of
PAS.
Against this backdrop, it seemed somewhat odd when in
1992 a note appeared in the Harvard Law Review accepting
the moral equivalence hypothesis more or less uncritically as a
basis for declaring a fundamental right to PAS. 3 In retrospect,
this note indeed presaged the two appellate court rulings of
1996, but when the argument first appeared in print it seemed
hardly likely to play in Peoria.
Opinion polls give a crude measure of where practicing
physicians stand in this debate. A reasonable summary of
polling data from the past decade indicates that while as many
as ninety percent of physicians support forgoing life-sustaining
treatment as an ethical option, only about half endorse PAS or
active euthanasia. 4 It is not clear whether the physicians en-
dorsing PAS do so because they believe the moral equivalence
hypothesis, or whether some or all of them believe that the act
is morally acceptable for other reasons, even though the moral
equivalence hypothesis is incorrect. My own suspicion is that
12. See Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthansasia, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10.
13. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance,
105 HARv. L. REV. 2021, 2040 (1992).
14. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in
Dying? The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658 (1992); Jerald G. Bachman et
al., Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Michigan, 331 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 812
(1994) (letter to editor); Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia Among Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 89,90 (1994).
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most practitioners basically agree with the multitude of state
supreme court rulings that followed in the wake of the Karen
Quinlan case in New Jersey.s In virtually all those rulings,
the courts stated that in permitting the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, they did not intend to permit either sui-
cide or homicide. In other words, I believe that substantially
fewer physicians would be willing to endorse forgoing life-
sustaining treatment if they were firmly convinced that that
act were the moral equivalent of PAS or active euthanasia."
THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
If practitioners generally remain unpersuaded by the
moral equivalence hypothesis, they seem traditionally wedded
to the principle of double effect, even if few of them could give a
detailed explanation of what that principle means.
The principle has a venerable tradition in ethics, particu-
larly within the Roman Catholic tradition, quite apart from its
medical applications. One may find a variety of statements of
its precise content;'7 for our purposes, the following account will
suffice:
1. I perform action A.
2. By performing A, I intend to accomplish outcome X.
3. A and X themselves are morally praiseworthy, or at
least morally neutral.
4. By doing A, I know that I will also accomplish, or risk
accomplishing, outcome Y.
5. I do not intend Y.
15. See Robert F. Weir & Larry Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining
Treatment for Nonautonomous Patients: Ethical Standards and Legal Liabil-
ity for Physicians After Cruzan, 264 JAMA 1846 (1990).
16. I have not addressed in this section another possible variant of the
moral equivalence hypothesis-that PAS is morally equivalent to active
euthanasia, regardless of whether either or both are morally equivalent to
forgoing treatment. This point has been occasionally debated in the medical-
ethical literature. See, e.g., Glenn C. Graber & Jennifer Chassman, Assisted
Suicide Is Not Voluntary Active Euthanasia, But It's Awfully Close, 41 J. AM.
GERIATRIC SOC'Y. 88 (1993); David T. Watts & Timothy Howell, Assisted Sui-
cide Is Not Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 40 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 1043
(1992). For what I am arguing in this article, one may assume that I regard
these two acts as morally equivalent, although I have argued for a somewhat
different view elsewhere. See Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compas-
sionate Response to a Medical Failure, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384 (1992).
17. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDERESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 206-211 (4th ed. 1994); Jorge L-A Garcia, Double Effect,
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 636, 636-641 (1995).
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6. There is no alternative action to accomplish X that
would not risk causing Y in the process.
The principle of double effect states that even if Y is morally
bad, it may be acceptable to do A in order to accomplish X. The
essence of the principle is that it is acceptable to do A if Y is a
foreseen but unintended consequence of an otherwise justifiable
act.
The principle of double effect is used by many ethicists,
particularly within religious traditions, to analyze a wide vari-
ety of acts, both medical and nonmedical. Whether abortion is
justifiable to save the life of a mother is just one example. In-
deed, in some ways, something akin to the principle of double
effect is central to medical practice; without it, surgery, for ex-
ample, would be ethically unacceptable.
There is one complexity of double effect that is not impor-
tant for present purposes. The point of distinguishing the ac-
tion A from the outcomes X and Y is to make it clear that A
causes X and Y, but that Y does not cause M. The classical
Roman Catholic account lays special stress on this point be-
cause that ethical tradition strongly opposes doing an evil act,
even if it might produce a good outcome as a consequence.
Otherwise stated, if the "evil" outcome Y directly caused the
"good" result X, then the action A would be immoral regard-
less.'8 For the ethicist who is not wedded to this religious tra-
dition, however, applying this rule often seems to lead to disin-
genuous hairsplitting. For instance, if it is evil to cause a
patient's death but good to relieve suffering, and a suffering
patient is being kept alive on a ventilator, then it would not be
moral to discontinue the ventilator to relieve the suffering be-
cause causing the patient to die, the evil outcome, would di-
rectly cause the good outcome. If the purpose of removing the
ventilator is to remove the burden that mechanical ventilation
places on the patient's body and death is a "foreseen but unin-
tended" consequence, however, then the action might be ethi-
cally acceptable. Such fine distinctions might be beneficial
within a system that opposes consequentialist ethical reason-
ing'9 and yet wants to allow for consequences making a moral
18. See Garcia, supra note 17, at 637.
19. Consequentialist ethical reasoning states that an action is good or bad
depending on whether the consequences that follow from it are good or bad, or
on the net balance is good and bad when all the consequences are considered.
A nonconsequentialist approach views certain actions, such as causing death,
as intrinsically wrong, regardless of the consequences they may produce.
[Vol. 82:939946
19981 MORAL EQUIVALENCE & DOUBLE EFFECT 947
difference, but they are not necessary for the present discus-
sion.
The application of double effect of interest here is the jus-
tification for using high doses of narcotic medication in treating
the pain of terminal illness. In the formula,
A = prescribing or administering high doses of narcotics,
X = relieving pain, and
Y = the risk of hastening death because of respiratory
depression due to the medication.
To show the value, as well as the potential precision, of the
principle of double effect, consider a recent commentary by two
experts in palliative care, Andrew Billings and Susan Block."
They argue for expanding the debate over PAS and euthanasia
within palliative care circles because, despite the field's wide-
spread rejection of those practices, some commonly accepted
palliative care activities are essentially indistinguishable from
euthanasia. One practice they consider to be "slow euthanasia
is increasing the rate of a morphine drip in a terminally ill and
often unconscious patient with the unspoken intention of has-
tening death, either for the patient's benefit or for the relief of
those standing by and watching the patient's suffering. This
probably occurs more frequently in general hospital practice
than in hospice programs, but Billings and Block claim that it
is commonplace nonetheless.
With respect to terminal analgesia, it is important to note
that there is an unexamined empirical assumption in the
statement of double effect. It is assumed that the risk of respi-
ratory depression is substantial when one uses narcotics in
needed doses in this setting. This was indeed thought to be the
case for many years, as part of the general phobia of opioid
drugs within the medical and nursing fields. More recent ex-
perience within palliative care has shown that respiratory de-
pression, although theoretically possible and occasionally en-
countered, very seldom is of practical concern when physicians
exercise care in adjusting dosages and observing patients for
responses to medication.2 In practice, the dosage level at
which one can achieve pain relief and the level at which respi-
20. See J. Andrew Billings & Susan D. Block, Slow Euthanasia, J.
PALLIATIvE CARE, Winter 1996, at 21.
2L See Howard Brody et al., Withdrawing Intensive Life-Sustaining
Treatment-Recommendations for Compassionate Clinical Management, 336
NEw ENG. J. MED. 652, 652-53 (1997).
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ratory depression might occur are much farther apart than
traditionally has been appreciated.
Consequently, two things are likely to happen in general
hospital settings where the physicians and nurses are rela-
tively unskilled in palliative care. First, if a patient is in pain,
staff will increase the rate of the morphine drip, and sometime
thereafter the patient will die. Staff will wrongly believe that
the drip hastened the patient's death, when in fact the patient
would have died at approximately the same time in any event.
Second, staff who indeed wish the patient to die more quickly
may accomplish this by increasing the morphine drip rate. To
accomplish their end, however, they will have to raise the dos-
age level much higher than is necessary for analgesia, and in
the process they will have to ignore fairly clear clinical signs
that pain has already been adequately relieved and that
breathing is becoming shallower and less frequent.
There is thus a clear practical difference in most cases be-
tween appropriately managing a morphine drip for terminal
pain relief and mismanaging a morphine drip as a form of sur-
reptitious euthanasia, real or imagined. The ethical difference,
as our formula has already made clear, is equally distinct. If
one intends to hasten death, one is no longer employing the
principle of double effect, and one can no longer seek shelter
under its moral umbrella.
Are we then sliding down a sort of "slippery slope" from
the legitimate employment of the principle of double effect in
terminal care to permitting "slow euthanasia"? After all, we
know that euthanasia and PAS occur surreptitiously despite
their illegal status.' But there is no reason to regard terminal
analgesia under the principle of double effect as any more
"slippery" than other practices. We can draw fairly clear dis-
tinctions, both conceptually and practically, between use and
abuse of this principle. If abuse occurs on a widespread basis
in general hospitals, the blame lies not with the principle but
with the level of ignorance of palliative care techniques, a mat-
ter to which I will return in greater detail below.
22. See William C. Wilson et al., Ordering and Administration of Seda-
tives and Analgesics During the Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support
from Critically Ill Patients, 267 JAMA 949, 952-53 (1992).
23. See Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthana-
sia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275
JAMA 919, 921 (1996).
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Despite its venerable tradition among practitioners, the
principle of double effect is not without critics. In a textbook
intended for clinicians, for instance, Bernard Lo argues along-
side Tom Beauchamp and James Childress that double effect
can easily become a form of rationalization:
People are held accountable for consequences they should have fore-
seen, not merely those consequences that they intended... The
doctrine of double effect also leads to the implausible conclusion that
physicians are more justified in administering large doses of narcot-
ics if they can put out of mind the possibility that death may be has-
tened.'
I would suggest, however, that the potential for abusing the
principle does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
principle itself is without merit.
To summarize the previous sections, then, most medical
practitioners in the United States believe they have a general
ethical roadmap for end-of-life care:
1. it is permissible to forgo life-sustaining medical ther-
apy at the informed request of a competent patient,
or at the request of the surrogate for an incompetent
patient; and
2. it is permissible to provide effective analgesia for
pain in terminal illness, even if the dosages required
approach levels that might hasten death; but
3. it is not permissible to perform PAS or active eutha-
nasia.'
If asked why the first is permissible while the third is not,
the physician would likely base her conclusion on a rejection of
the moral equivalence hypothesis. If asked why the second is
permissible and the third is not, she would likely allude to the
principle of double effect. If challenged, it is true that the
physician would probably be unable to discuss the nuances of
either ethical argument; a substantial minority of physicians
are perhaps even prepared to argue that the third is outmoded
and should be re-evaluated. In general, however, physicians
have long assumed that the federal courts were on their side as
they followed these general rules of conduct.
24. BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETMCAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLI-
NICIANS 143 (1995).
25. While a narrow majority of physicians support PAS and its legaliza-
tion, they do not appear to hold this position because they see it as congruent
with the "received" medical ethic. Rather, they argue that the received medi-
cal ethic needs to be revised and extended.
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THE NINTH CIRCUiT
Against this background, the ruling of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals seemed to toss conventional medical wisdom
into a cocked hat.
The court began by redefining the basic question it was to
address. The issue was not, according to the court, whether
there is a "constitutional right to aid in killing oneself," as the
original three-judge panel had phrased it, but rather "whether
there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner
of one's death."6 This reformulation tended already to beg the
question, and to tip the scales in favor of accepting the moral
equivalence hypothesis. If the moral equivalence hypothesis is
indeed correct, and forgoing treatment is an morally acceptable
act, then both PAS and forgoing life-sustaining treatment
would be morally acceptable ways of determining the time and
manner of one's death.
The court explained that it preferred this broader reformu-
lation because it was not sure that "suicide" was the correct label
for the sort of action involved in the case:
[A] competent adult has a liberty interest in refusing to be connected
to a respirator or in being disconnected from one, even if he is termi-
nally ill and cannot live without mechanical assistance. The law does
not classify the death of a patient that results from the granting of
his wish to decline or discontinue treatment as "suicide." Nor does
the law label the acts of those who help the patient carry out that
wish... as assistance in suicideY
The court therefore hinted that it had already judged that
the action described in the case was morally equivalent to PAS,
and if calling PAS "suicide" implies a moral stigma, then the
same moral stigma ought to apply to forgoing treatment. Con-
versely, if forgoing treatment is not morally stigmatized, then
PAS should not be either.
The court argued that the Cruzan, ruling of the Supreme
Court presaged such an expanded liberty interest. The Supreme
Court must have recognized that removing Nancy Cruzan's
feeding tube would "lead inexorably to her death,"9 so if there
was some liberty interest in having this tube withdrawn, it
26. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(emphasis added).
27. Id. at 802.
28. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
29. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
[Vol. 82:939950
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must have been a "liberty interest in hastening one's own
death."30 In fact, the court explicitly stated that "it was the dis-
continuance of the provision of food and water, not Cruzan's
accident almost eight years earlier, that caused her death."3'
As a further salvo in defense of moral equivalence, the court
noted that the same abuses many fear from legalizing PAS,
such as exerting pressure on vulnerable patients to die prema-
turely, could arise just as easily from the lax use of advance di-
rectives.
The court then addressed the principle of double effect,
finding it essentially devoid of value. 2 The fact that "ethical"
physicians are prepared to administer high doses of narcotics
in terminal pain management was seen by the court as evi-
dence that many terminally ill patients die from drugs rather
than their underlying diseases. This could only mean that medi-
cal practitioners are already crossing the bridge from letting die
to PAS. The opinion concluded that the language of double ef-
fect
may salve the conscience of the AMA, but it does not change the re-
alities of the practice of medicine or the legal consequences that
would normally flow from the commission of an act one has reason to
believe will likely result in the death of another. In the case of
"double effect" we excuse the act or, to put it more accurately, we find
the act acceptable, not because the doctors sugarcoat the facts in or-
der to permit society to say that they couldn't really know the conse-
quences of their action, but because the act is medically and ethically
appropriate even though the result-the patient's death-is both
foreseeable and intended.3
The court was so dismissive of the very notion of double ef-
fect as anything other than moral hypocrisy that it failed to
make clear its underlying empirical assumptions. Was the
court convinced that many cases of high-dosage narcotic treat-
ment are really cases of what Billings and Block call "slow
euthanasia,"34 and did the court believe that conduct to be
morally acceptable? Or did the court believe that the real risk
of hastening death, when narcotics are titrated properly to-
ward the goal of adequate pain relief, is extremely high? The
30. Id.
31. Id. at 820 n.91.
32. See id. at 821-22.
33. Id. at 823 n.95.
34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the similarity
between terminal pain management and euthanasia).
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first assumption is at least questionable35 and the second is
demonstrably incorrect. 6
If these empirical assumptions arose simply from an igno-
rance of the present potential of palliative care, then the court
gave ample evidence that it shares the level of ignorance of
many members of the medical profession today. In fact, one
looks in vain through the entire body of this lengthy ruling for
any evidence that there is such a thing as successful palliative
care. For example, the court mentioned the case of an AIDS
patient who requested medication to hasten his impending
death after enduring four excruciating months "because he did
not wish to die in a hospital in a drug-induced stupor,"37 as if
enduring incredible pain or being rendered stuporous are the
only choices available to the average terminally ill patient.
Another passage that typifies the court's view reads as follows:
[T]erminally ill adults who wish to die can only be maintained in a
debilitated and deteriorating state, unable to enjoy the presence of
family or friends. Not only is the state's interest in preventing such
individuals from hastening their deaths of comparatively little
weight, but its insistence on fistrating their wishes seems cruel in-
deed. As Kent said in King Lear, when signs of life were seen in the
dying monarch:
Vex not his ghost: 0! let him pass; he hate him
That would upon the rack of this tough world
Stretch him out longer."
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
The narrower reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals led it to espouse the moral equivalence hypothesis, with-
out addressing the principle of double effect.
The Second Circuit differed from the Ninth in its reluctance
to find a new fundamental right to assisted suicide, because it
could not be described as "deeply rooted" in the nation's his-
tory.39 Nor was the court 'inclined to take a more expansive
view of... authority to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause." Ultimately, however,
35. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing "slow
euthanasia").
36. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
37. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 834.
38. Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
39. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997).
40. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)).
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the court found grounds to overturn the New York statute
prohibiting PAS in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This reasoning required the court to
adopt the moral equivalence hypothesis (or at least its legal
cousin), because if PAS and forgoing treatment were signifi-
cantly different ethical actions, it would not violate the Equal
Protection clause to permit terminally ill patients to do the latter
but not the former. As the court stated:
New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons alike: those
in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life support systems
are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such
systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for the previous
attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten
death by self-administering prescribed drugs.4'
In this case it again appeared that the framing of the
"factual" circumstances begged the moral question. The issues
in the case were precisely whether two terminally ill patients,
one connected to life-support equipment and the other not, are
indeed "similarly situated," and whether "hastening death" is
indeed the proper moral description of the act of forgoing life-
sustaining therapy.'
In defense of the moral equivalence hypothesis, the court
turned to an ironic source: Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
in Cruzan. Scalia argued that the action-inaction distinction is
irrelevant because "the cause of death in both cases [PAS and
forgoing treatment] is the suicide's conscious decision to 'pu[t]
an end to his own existence."'3 Rather than advocating PAS,
however, Scalia's intent in Cruzan was to invoke the moral
equivalence hypothesis to argue that since PAS is illegal, forgo-
ing therapy should be as well.' The Second Circuit used his
4L Id. at 729.
42. The court assumed, reasonably in my view, that a patient near death
who is not attached to life support, but who is suffering enough to contem-
plate PAS, probably received some form of life-prolonging medical care during
an earlier stage of illness to allow the illness to reach such an advanced stage.
Thus, the court laid the groundwork for rejecting the idea that forgoing life-
sustaining treatment, unlike PAS, merely allows the "natural" course of the
illness to unfold. The court suggested, along with several philosophers who
filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court, that there is no longer such a
thing as the natural course of illness. See id; infra note 45 and accompanying
text; see also Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher's Brief,
N.Y. REV. BooKs, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41,42.
43. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-297 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLAciToNE, ComMENTARIEs
*189).
44. Hence his use of the loaded term "suicide" to describe both categories
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words to argue the opposite conclusion, namely that since for-
going treatment is recognized as a basic right, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires that PAS be afforded similar protection
in sufficiently similar circumstances. According to the court,
there is nothing "natural" about causing death by means other than
the original illness or its complications. The withdrawal of nutrition
brings on death by starvation, the withdrawal of hydration brings on
death by dehydration, and the withdrawal of ventilation brings about
respiratory failure. By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial
life-sustaining processes .... a patient hastens his death by means
that are not natural in any sense.4
Practitioners, therefore, "do not fulfill the role of 'killer' by pre-
scribing drugs to hasten death any more than they do by dis-
connecting life-support systems.'
While the Second Circuit's opinion did not have the same
dismissive and occasionally contemptuous tone as the Ninth
Circuit's, it amounted to an equally severe assault on conven-
tional medical thinking. The court told physicians, in effect,
that just as Moliere's character had been speaking prose all his
life but never realized it, doctors had been assisting suicide
throughout their careers without realizing it. In essence, the
court said that in asking physicians to assist in suicides now, it
was merely asking them to do something legally and morally
indistinguishable from what they had always done. If that no-
tion seemed radical, it merely illustrated how obtuse the court
believed doctors had been in the past. Oddly, neither court
seemed to recognize the collision that was certain to occur be-
tween their lines of reasoning and accepted medical wisdom on
ethical care at the end of life. Had physicians actually ac-
cepted the reasoning of the federal courts of appeals, they
would not merely have agreed to add PAS to their medical ar-
mamentarium; they would have been forced to radically re-
think virtually every aspect of providing and forgoing care for
dying patients.
THE SUPREME COURT
In reversing the two appellate court rulings and denying
the existence of a constitutionally protected right to physician-
assisted suicide, the Supreme Court principally employed a
historical argument. The Court agreed with the Second Circuit
that the Due Process Clause protects only those fundamental
of patients.
45. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
46. Id. at 730.
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rights and liberties 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."47 Because the historical record is squarely opposed
to any recognition of a right to suicide or suicide assistance, the
Court believed that it could not find any such basic liberty in-
terest. According to the Court, the task of balancing the liberty
interests of individual citizens with the traditionally recog-
nized state interest in preventing suicide is best left to the leg-
islature; it would be inappropriate for the judicial branch to in-
tervene to elevate individual interests at the expense of the
state's concerns.
The Court's mode of argument thus diverged for the two
appeals. With respect to the Ninth Circuit's holding, which es-
tablished a basic right to PAS, the Court did not feel compelled
to directly address either the moral equivalence hypothesis or
the principle of double effect. It believed that it was sufficient
to invoke the historical record on laws opposing suicide and
suicide assistance.' The Court simply noted in passing that
the Ninth Circuit had misunderstood Cruzan:
The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be
just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.
Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite
distinct4 9
In other words, the Court felt that given the disconnect be-
tween the moral equivalence hypothesis and the legal tradition,
all it needed to do in its ruling was invoke history and assert
(without substantive argument) that PAS and forgoing treat-
ment were morally distinct acts. The principle of double effect
could simply be ignored.
By contrast, when it discussed the Second Circuit's deci-
sion, the Court had no such "out" because the Second Circuit
had not found a fundamental right to PAS in the Constitution.
Instead, it had to address the moral equivalence hypothesis in
a more direct way:
Unlike the court of appeals, we think the distinction between assist-
ing suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our
legal traditions, is both important and logical; it is certainly ra-
tional.5
47. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (quoting
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977)).
48. See id. at 2268-69.
49. Id. at 2270.
50. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2298 (1997).
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Unfortunately, from an academic standpoint, the Court
then proceeded to rehash rather stale arguments in favor of
moral nonequivalence: the physician in PAS must intend the
patient's death, while the physician withdrawing treatment
may merely intend that the patient be freed from unwanted
medical interventions; in PAS the physician kills the patient,
while in withholding treatment the patient dies of the underly-
ing disease. This was indeed an argument against the moral
equivalence hypothesis that more closely comports with the
prevailing sentiment in the medical community, but it was
conducted as if the bioethical debate of the last two decades
never occurred. In a paper for a graduate seminar in bioethics,
it would have been lucky to earn a C-minus.5'
The concurring opinions by individual justices attempted
to shed more light on the underlying issues. Justice O'Connor
stated:
[Tihere is no need to address the question whether suffering patients
have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the
suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives.
There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York
can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their
deaths.
52
Here, O'Connor seems to be addressing the principle of
double effect as a legal construct, permitting even such pallia-
51. It may be indicative of the quality of the reasoning that the Court, in
its majority opinion, cites only sources widely viewed as opposed to PAS, with
no mention of any sources that are either neutral or in sympathy. Apparently
Lawrence Gostin agrees with my "C-minus" grade, stating,
The Supreme Court in Vacco found the distinction between assisted
suicide and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to be "important,
logical, rational, and well-established." Yet, its reasons for differenti-
ating between the two practices fly in the face of a body of philosophic
literature examining questions of causation and intention in medi-
cine.
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom, 278 JAMA
1523, 1527 (1997) (footnote omitted).
Gostin, in turn, sees a better reason to distinguish between PAS and for-
going treatment in the distinction between negative and positive duties, argu-
ing that a right to forgo treatment places only a negative duty upon the phy-
sician (not to interfere with the patient) while a right to PAS would create a
positive duty to perform various affirmative acts leading to death. But this in
turn seems too simple, since most managements of "withdrawal of treatment"
actually entail a mix of doings and omissions on the part of the medical staff.
It may be argued that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, in order to be
done compassionately, requires a number of associated medical "doings." See
Brody et al., supra note 21.
52. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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rive measures as terminal sedation and barbiturate coma that
undeniably shorten life. It is not clear from this passage, how-
ever, whether she was swayed by the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit and believed that shortening life was a frequent conse-
quence of routine palliative care. Nor is there any hint that
she is aware that in practice, quality palliative care may be
difficult to obtain, even absent constitutional barriers. The as-
sumption appears to be that the ready availability of palliative
care is itself an argument against creating or recognizing any
legal right to PAS.
Justice Stevens, in the "concurring" opinion that most
closely resembles a dissent from the majority's reasoning, ex-
hibited a greater understanding of the issues underlying the
principle of double effect. He stated, "Encouraging the devel-
opment and ensuring the availability of adequate pain treat-
ment is of utmost importance; palliative care, however, cannot
alleviate all pain and suffering."' Thus, unlike Justice
O'Connor, Stevens explicitly recognized both that there may be
problems with obtaining access to palliative care, and that pal-
liative care by itself is not a definitive argument against allow-
ing PAS. Stevens went on to address both the potential
strengths and weaknesses of the moral equivalence hypothesis:
[Bjecause physicians are already involved in making decisions that
hasten the death of terminally ill patients-through termination of
life support, withholding of medical treatment, and terminal seda-
tion-there is in fact significant tension between the traditional view
of the physician's role and the actual practice in a growing number of
cases .... I agree that the distinction between permitting death to
ensue from an underlying fatal disease and causing it to occur by the
administration of medication or other means provides a constitu-
tionally sufficient basis for the State's classification. Unlike the
Court, however, I am not persuaded that in all cases there will in fact
be a significant difference between the intent of the physicians, the
patients or the families in the two situations.'
Here, at long last, one finds legal language consistent with
what I take to be the best philosophical analyses of the moral
equivalence hypothesis. Instead of the uncritical embracing of
53. Id. at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54. Id, at 2309-10 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation and footnotes omit-
ted). I will leave to legal analysts the discussion of how wide a door the con-
curring opinions generally left open for future constitutional challenges to
anti-PAS laws, based on the facts of specific cases. The possibility of such fu-
ture cases is of great interest legally and ethically, but would, I contend, have
little impact on clinical practice today. I appreciate Kathryn L. Tucker calling
my attention to the importance of this aspect of the decision.
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the hypothesis by the courts of appeals, or the equally uncriti-
cal rejection of the hypothesis by the majority, Justice Stevens
offered a nuanced appreciation that whether or not there is a
significant difference in causality, intent, and other morally
important features between a case of PAS and a case of forgo-
ing treatment will depend in the final analysis on the facts of
the particular cases.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE
If some physicians choose to defend PAS and active eutha-
nasia and call for changes in the law to permit and regulate
these practices, then it is important that they rely on the best
possible justifications for this view." Defenders of assisted
death should not expect to make their case "on the cheap"; in
other words, they must do more than simply cite a similar but
legally distinct medical practice and argue that if that practice
is allowed, PAS should be as well. They should look PAS
squarely in the eye, with all its advantages and disadvantages,
and argue cogently and forthrightly that the practice should be
permitted.
Because the debate over PAS seems destined not to be re-
solved in the foreseeable future, however, physicians of all per-
suasions must agree in the meantime how to improve the care
of the dying right now. In the face of compelling evidence that
the status quo is far below optimal, if not actually scandalous,56
there is no excuse for debating bioethics rather than focusing
on the practical steps needed to improve the current quality of
terminal care. The Second and Ninth Circuit opinions were a
setback to that clinical goal; the Supreme Court at least wiped
the slate clean, but without substituting any superior view.'
55. See Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119 (1994).
56. See generally COMMIE ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE
(Marilyn J. Field & Christine I. Cassel eds., 1997); Charles S. Cleeland et al,
Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic Cancer, 330 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 592 (1994); The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial
to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Under-
stand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment
(SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
57. But compare the view of Robert Burt, who argues that the decision
amounts to finding "a constitutional right to palliative care." Robert A. Burt,
The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to
Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997). Nor is this to say that
the Supreme Court opinions had no value even to physicians who might favor
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Clinicians must believe, to some degree, in a form of the
principle of double effect in order to provide optimal symptom
relief at the end of life." This is so because all physicians
ought to be equally committed to palliative goals. Roughly a
third of physicians, however, are strongly opposed to PAS or
euthanasia on moral grounds. At least that third of physicians
must be reassured that if they use the most effective palliative
techniques, no one will accuse them of violating their own
moral codes and deliberately causing death. A serious assault
on the logic of the principle of double effect could do major vio-
lence to the (already reluctant and ill-informed) commitment of
most physicians to the goals of palliative care and hospice.
It would, of course, be desirable for this general endorse-
ment of double effect to be combined with a sophisticated un-
derstanding of the bioethical debate about that principle and
its potential abuses. This would prevent physicians from mis-
takenly concluding that surreptitious or "slow" euthanasia can
be carried out under the moral cover of that principle. 9 How-
ever, to ask the average physician to attend so carefully and
consistently to the rather academic discourse of philosophical
bioethicists on this point may be a counsel of perfection.
PAS. The Court upheld the permissibility of forgoing life-sustaining treat-
ment, of high-dose pain relief in terminal care, and even of terminal sedation.
It encouraged ongoing debate over the issues and state-by-state experimenta-
tion with legislation; and indicated that it might hear specific future cases.
But cf. supra text accompanying note 51 (asserting that the Supreme Court's
reasoning was biased against PAS in that the Court relied solely on sources
that opposed PAS). For these observations I am indebted to Timothy Quill,
one of the appellants in the Second Circuit case. See generally Timothy Quill,
Address at Michigan State Medical Society Bioethics Conference (Sept. 27,
1997).
58. I am indebted to Franklin G. Miller for the reminder that "some form"
of the principle of double effect need not be a form that rejects consequential-
ist arguments and demands adherence to absolute moral principles; and if so,
the new "form" of the principle is so far away from the traditional roots of that
mode of moral reasoning to be no longer recognizable as "double effect." One
then simply argues that it is all right to administer high-dose painkillers be-
cause of the ratio of benefit to burden (i.e., good consequences to bad conse-
quences); the good intentions of the physician; patient consent; and the lack of
better alternatives.
59. I say this with the belief that either euthanasia and PAS should not
be performed, or they should be performed openly and regulated appropri-
ately. See Miller et al., supra note 55; Franklin G. Miller et al., Can Physi-
clan-Assisted Suicide Be Regulated Effectively?, 24 J.L. MED. ET-ICS 225
(1996). If the majority of physicians and patients agree that PAS and eutha-
nasia are moral acts, but the law continues to deny permission and guidance,
then many would argue that sub rosa practices such as "slow euthanasia" be-
come the best available safety value under those suboptimal circumstances.
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For a similar reason, it is highly desirable that a rough
practical distinction be maintained between both the ethics
and the law of forgoing therapy and of PAS or euthanasia.
This is necessary if the one-third of physicians strongly opposed
to PAS are to accept the rights of patients and their surrogates
to refuse life-prolonging care.' Perhaps more important, how-
ever, is the need to ensure that the current legal protections
patients enjoy in making these decisions not be dissipated or
reversed. Susan Wolf was probably the first to call attention to
the relatively flimsy basis of the present "consensus" in favor of
the right to refuse treatment. Her warning that the moral
equivalence hypothesis could as easily be used to eliminate the
rights of patients to refuse treatment as to support PAS remains
pertinent today, despite the Supreme Court rulings in Cruzan
and the present two cases.6
The political power and will of those who would impose
their religiously grounded right-to-life perspective upon society
through force of law do not seem to have diminished. If, for in-
stance, while PAS remains illegal, there are widespread calls
for refusal of nutrition and hydration as the quickest and most
painless way to hasten one's death,62 then there are likely to be
efforts made to reverse the legal position that refusing food and
water is protected to the same degree as refusing a ventilator.
Similarly, if it becomes widely known (or alleged) that pallia-
tive care techniques sometimes deliberately hasten death,' we
can expect new laws to be introduced that would hamstring
palliative practice.' In at least some states, such laws would
60. Robert A. Burt, analyzing the Supreme Court decisions for the New
England Journal of Medicine writes, "In the wake of the Second Circuit
Court's ruling, some physicians in New York had found new reasons to over-
rule patients' refusals of life-prolonging treatment and even more reasons to
fear the legal consequences of adequately managing symptoms through the
use of opioids .... " Burt, supra note 57, at 1234. However, Burt cites no
source for this claim.
61. Susan M. Wolf, Holding the Line on Euthanasia, 19 HAsTIbNGs
CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at S13.
62. See James L. Bernat et al., Patient Refusal of Hydration and Nutri-
tion: An Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide or Voluntary Active Eutha-
nasia, 153 ARCHIVEs INTERNAL MED. 2723 (1993); David M. Eddy, A Conver-
sation with My Mother, 272 JAMA 179 (1994).
63. See Billings & Block, supra note 20, at 22; David Orentlicher, The Su-
preme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide but
Embracing Euthanasia, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1236 (1997).
64. Addressing the flip side of this coin, David Orentlicher argues that by
rejecting assisted suicide but apparently accepting terminal sedation and
barbiturate coma, the Court actually moved in the direction of "embracing
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likely pass, and it is not at all clear that they would be re-
versed upon court challenge, considering the current preva-
lence of conservative judges in the court system.
Even if the more general right to refuse "extraordinary"
medical therapy remains untouched by such laws, they could
exert a highly pernicious chilling effect upon physician prac-
tices in terminal care, and upon patient perceptions that they
retain some control over medical decisions." Ironically, the net
result of this scenario is likely to be an increase in surrepti-
tious PAS, despite the fact that those who would champion
these changes in social policy will use the fear of a "slippery
slope" toward PAS as one of their rallying cries.
While a rule-of-thumb distinction between forgoing treat-
ment and PAS or active euthanasia is highly desirable for pur-
poses of public policy, one would wish that physicians had a
deeper understanding of the clinical difficulties in defining
these categories. One would like physicians to attain the level
of understanding suggested by Justice Stevens, namely that in
particular cases of forgoing treatment or administering pallia-
tive care, physician intent and the degree of causation of death
might be virtually indistinguishable from that in cases of PAS
or euthanasia. The public policy distinction works precisely
because many cases fit nicely within the general categories, but
there are also going to be messy cases which sit on the fences."
A serious policy question with regard to the fence-sitting
cases is how health care professionals will explain them to the
public. Thus far, the tendency has been for organized medi-
euthanasia." Orentlicher, supra note 63, at 1239.
65. A good case in point is Katherine L. Tucker's article, Surrogate End of
Life Decisionmaking: The Importance of Providing Procedural Due Process, A
Case Review, 72 WASH. L. REV. 859 (1997), which describes a case in which a
flawed decision to remove a feeding tube was made by a family-member sur-
rogate (and reversed upon court review). Tucker then notes that Washington
case law precedent permits surrogate decisions to withdraw life-prolonging
treatment only for two classes of patients: terminally ill and permanently un-
conscious. She further argues for "prognosis committees" as a necessary proce-
dural safeguard and seems dismissive of hospital ethics committees, as currently
constituted, in that function. Legal questions aside, I agree with Tucker that
an unfortunate aspect of the "reverse slippery slope" has been the fact that
decisions to withdraw treatment may be made too cavalierly because the
spotlight of controversy has shifted over to assisted suicide and euthanasia.
That said, I think the legal and procedural solutions she proposes would be far
too restrictive in actual practice and would have the effect of prolonging the
suffering of many incurable patients, though the full consideration of this
question is beyond the scope of this Article.
66. See Brody, supra note 10.
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cine, in its public proclamations, to act as if everything fits
within the well-defined category limits, treating the messy
cases as an inside secret with which we should not burden the
public's delicate sensibilities.67 I believe this strategy is certain
to reduce public trust in medicine in the long run, perhaps ul-
timately restricting the allowable amount of physician discre-
tion in managing terminal care. We must find better ways to
make the public and policymakers understand that fence-
sitting cases do exist, and that these cases present a multitude
of problems.68
CONCLUSION
Patients with terminal illnesses will receive the best care
when physicians and other health professionals adhere to cer-
tain general rules of thumb for ethical practice. For some
years, a rough consensus on these rules of thumb had been
evolving. The decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits tem-
porarily undermined that evolving ethical consensus. The Su-
preme Court provided little thoughtful guidance with regard to
those ethical principles, but at least restored the status quo
ante by overturning the lower court rulings.
Ethical constructs are not sufficient to assure good clinical
practice, however; personal and institutional habits, reim-
bursement incentives, and many other forces may work to re-
duce the quality of terminal care. While the status of PAS will
probably be debated well into the future, some things are cer-
67. In this regard, one of the most worrisome features of the Billings and
Block controversy is the note by the editor of the palliative care journal that
colleagues had appealed to him to suppress publication of the article. See
David J. Roy, On the Ethics of Euthanasia Discourse, J. PALLIATIVE CARE,
Winter 1996, at 3 (editorial) (discussing his decision to publish the lead article
by J. Andrew Billings and Susan D. Block, supra note 20).
68. It is my understanding that there is relatively little established law,
either statutory or case law, regarding these "fence-sitting" cases. Because
the medical profession has not brought them to public attention, they gener-
ally are not addressed by legislators; perhaps surprisingly, few of these cases
have been brought to court. In light of the goal of more explicit and open rec-
ognition of the problem, however, the Supreme Coures discussion of one
fence-sitting category, terminal sedation, is probably a move in the right di-
rection. On this point, see Orentlicher, supra note 63. Many physicians
probably prefer that the law remain silent on these cases and that they be
handled in the future by medical discretion; to some extent, this is probably
unavoidable. For a discussion of the inability of law to deal effectively with
these difficult cases, see J. Griffiths, The Regulation of Euthanasia and Re-
lated Medical Procedures that Shorten Life in the Netherlands, 1 MED. LAW
INT. 137 (1994).
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tain under the law. Patients have an ethical and legal right to
determine whether to accept life-prolonging therapy, and they
have an ethical (and legal, according to some Supreme Court
justices) right to adequate pain relief, especially in cases of
terminal illness. There is a pressing need today for both phy-
sicians who oppose and physicians who support legalization of
PAS to put aside those differences and form alliances for en-
hanced terminal care, so that all patients are provided these
treatment options. It is likely that in doing so, they will sub-
stantially reduce the number of patients who feel driven to
seek PAS.

